Time to lay the Libet experiment to rest: Commentary on Papanicolaou (2017). by Kihlstrom, JF
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title
Time to lay the Libet experiment to rest: Commentary on Papanicolaou 
(2017).
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2w72b2bm
Journal
Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 4(3)
ISSN
2326-5523
Author
Kihlstrom, John F
Publication Date
2017-09-01
DOI
10.1037/cns0000124
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
COMMENTARY
Time to Lay the Libet Experiment to Rest: Commentary on
Papanicolaou (2017)
John F. Kihlstrom
University of California, Berkeley
For more than 30 years, “the Libet experiment” has inspired and dominated philosoph-
ical and scientific discussions of free will and determinism. Unfortunately, this famous
experiment has been compromised by a serious confounding variable (i.e., there has
been no control for watching the clock), and the method of data collection ignored
conscious mental activity that occurred prior to the decision to act. Because Libet’s
results appear to be wholly an artifact of his method, his experiment should be
discounted in future discussions of the problem of free will.
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For more than 30 years, an experiment by
Benjamin Libet, a psychophysiologist interested
in psychoanalytic theory, has inspired and dom-
inated discussions of free will and conscious
agency. Starting with Libet, Wright, and Glea-
son (1982), Libet capitalized on an electroen-
cephalographic (EEG) signature known as the
readiness potential (RP, or Bereitschaftspoten-
tial in the original German; Kornhuber &
Deecke, 1965, 1990), a negative shift in voltage
which occurs prior to voluntary muscle move-
ments—somewhat in the manner of an event-
related potential (though recorded before, not
after, the event in question). There is also a
lateralized readiness potential (LRP), discern-
able in the hemisphere contralateral to the limb
which actually makes the movement (Trevena
& Miller, 2002). The usual interpretation of
both the RP and LRP is that it they are the
neural correlates of the “planning, preparation,
and initiation of volitional acts” (Kornhuber &
Deecke, 1990, p. 14) initially appearing in both
hemispheres, and then shifting to the hemi-
sphere contralateral to the limb that will actually
execute the movement.
In his experiment, Libet and his colleagues
asked subjects to perform a simple spontaneous
motor activity, flicking a finger or flexing a
wrist, while watching a fast-moving clock, and
to note the time at which they decided to make
the movement (Libet, 1985; Libet, Gleason,
Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Libet et al., 1982). Ex-
amining the EEG data, they observed that the
RP began approximately 350 ms before subjects
decided to make the movement—which, in turn,
occurred about 200 ms before the movement
began. Libet concluded from this predecisional
negative shift (PNS) that “cerebral initiation of
a spontaneous voluntary act begins uncon-
sciously,” although he argued that subjects
could still exercise conscious control, or “veto,”
over “the final decision to act” (Libet, 1985, p.
529; see also Libet, 1999).
As Papanicolaou (2017) showed, Libet’s es-
sential findings have been independently repli-
cated in a number of different laboratories. The
precise onset of the PNS varies considerably from
one subject, and one experiment, to another, but
the confidence interval around Libet’s average
does not include zero, and if anything, his estimate
of the onset of the PNS may be too short by a
factor of 2 (Trevena & Miller, 2002). It is inter-
esting to note, the same EEG signature also occurs
before subjects decide not to make a movement
(Trevena & Miller, 2010), so by Libet’s logic, the
beginnings of inaction are unconscious as well.
Presumably, by extension, the origins of the veto,
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which is the only function Libet allowed for con-
sciousness, are also unconscious. To paraphrase
William James (James, 1882, p. 82), it’s uncon-
scious all the way down.
Libet’s experiment has often been taken as a
challenge to the folk-psychological concept of
free will. Consider just a few salient examples,
among dozens, that have invoked the Libet ex-
periment as evidence for the conclusion that the
commonsense notion of free will is incompati-
ble with modern science.
1. The late Daniel Wegner, a prominent so-
cial psychologist, used the Libet experi-
ment as the springboard to argue that the
experience of conscious will was an illu-
sion, that the true causes of action were
unconscious, and that the reasons we give
for our behavior are little more than after-
the-fact rationalizations (Wegner, 2002;
for précis and commentary, see Wegner,
2004).
2. Michael Gazzaniga (2011), often called
the “founding father” of cognitive neuro-
science, and sometime member of the
President’s Commission on Bioethics, ar-
gued that Libet and other neuroscientists
had solved the problem of free will for
philosophers—by showing that we do not
have it.
3. Christof Koch (2012), a prominent neuro-
scientist and author of the “Consciousness
Redux” column in Scientific American,
concluded that “The brain acts before the
mind decides! This is a complete reversal
of the deeply held intuition of mental cau-
sation—the brain and the body act only
after the mind has willed it” (p. 106).
4. Sam Harris (2012), another neuroscientist
and leader of the “New Atheist” move-
ment, similarly concluded that our
thoughts and actions are determined by
causes of which we have no conscious
awareness and over which we have no
conscious control.
5. In 2012, widespread interest in Libet’s
experiment and similar challenges
prompted the John Templeton Foundation
to initiate a grant program on “Finding
Free Will,” devoting millions of dollars to
the study of the philosophical, theological,
and scientific aspects of the topic (e.g.,
Glannon, 2015).
6. Inspired by the Libet experiment, Yuva
Harari (2017), author of the acclaimed
Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind
(Harari, 2015), wrote in his sequel, Homo
Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow that
“The life sciences undermine liberalism,
arguing that the free individual is just a
fictional tale concocted by an assembly of
biochemical algorithms” (p. 293).
At the same time, some philosophers and
psychologists have raised conceptual and meth-
odological objections to Libet’s conclusions
(Libet, 1985, 1999; Libet et al., 1982, 1983).
For example, it has been argued that the task set
for Libet’s subjects was utterly trivial, so his
findings should not be generalized to the real
world of decision, choice, and action. More
substantively, it was argued that, in Libet’s ex-
periment, the important decision had already
been made before individual trials began—
namely, the decision to participate in the exper-
iment to begin with. Here, for example, is the
philosopher John Searle, writing about the Libet
experiment and others like it (Searle, 2013, p.
55, emphasis original).
The cases in question are all cases where the subject
has already made up his mind to eventually perform a
course of action, and the brain has an increased activity
prior to his awareness of a conscious decision to phys-
ically perform it; but the presence of the readiness
potential does not constitute a causally sufficient con-
dition for the performance of the action. It could be the
case that a person would have been inclined to push a
button, that the brain then undertook the activity called
readiness potential, and that the person would not push
the button. Readiness potential in the brain is not a
condition that is sufficient to cause the act. It is asso-
ciated with the act but does not determine it.
Papanicolaou (2017) covered most of these
objections in his review, and there is no need to
go over that territory again here—except to say
that Searle’s (2013) criticism turns out to have
been very close to the mark.
Papanicolaou (2017) also does an excellent
job detailing the major methodological objec-
tions to the Libet experiment. Libet gave both
subjects and experimenters extremely challeng-
ing tasks, with a lot of potential for random and
systematic error to creep in. Subjects have to
pay attention to their own thoughts as well as to
a swiftly changing timer—essentially a divided
attention task. Experimenters have to determine
precisely when the readiness potential begins to
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rise—in the early 1980s, with polygraphs gen-
erating reams of paper records, a challenge for
the eyes. However, the best guess is that these
sources of potential errors probably cancel each
other out (Banks & Pockett, 2007; Pockett,
2004).
Unfortunately, Papanicolaou (2017) gives
short shrift—only a single sentence—to the
most important objection of all to Libet’s ex-
perimental design (Libet, 1985, 1999; Libet et
al., 1982, 1983): It has a fatal methodological
flaw. For all the various arguments over mea-
surement error, Libet’s critics missed an impor-
tant feature of his experiment: Subjects must
keep track of a timer while they’re deciding to
move. Miller and his colleagues (Miller, Shep-
herdson, & Trevena, 2011) replicated Libet’s
procedure, and observed a clear PNS. But they
also ran a control condition in which subjects
made spontaneous movements, but did not
watch the clock. The logic of Libet’s argument
is that the PNS should be observed regardless of
whether subjects are timing themselves. In ei-
ther case, the PNS should begin to appear by
about 350 ms before the subject moves. But it
didn’t: Eliminating the clock also eliminated the
PNS entirely. Libet’s PNS occurred as a conse-
quence of watching the clock.
As if that were not enough, research by
Schurger and his colleagues has undercut the
traditional interpretation of the RP itself
(Schurger, Mylopoulos, & Rosenthal, 2016;
Schurger, Sitt, & Dehaene, 2012). Kornhuber
and Deecke (1990) assumed that the RP re-
flected planning and preparation for movement;
Libet agreed, but concluded that most of this
activity was unconscious. Schurger et al. (2012)
followed Libet’s basic paradigm, but in addi-
tion, subjects were asked to make a movement
in response to occasional auditory cues—a pro-
cedure they called Libetus interruptus. These
cued responses were intended to preclude the
kind of planning and preparation normally im-
plicated in the RP and PNS. Response latencies
were shortest when the cue was presented as the
fluctuating EEG signal approached its peak neg-
ativity. Based on these findings, as well as the
results of a computer simulation, (Schurger et
al., 2016) suggested that the “apparent pre-
movement buildup of neuronal activity” (em-
phasis added) reflected “the ebb and flow of
background neuronal noise, rather than the out-
come of a specific neural event corresponding to
a ‘decision’ to initiate movement” (p. 77).
When the activity of this stochastic “neural ac-
cumulator” crosses a threshold, the “neural de-
cision to move” is made, and the movement is
executed roughly 200 ms later. But what is
being accumulated? In the case of externally
cued movements, it is “sensory evidence” of the
cue to move; in the case of spontaneous move-
ments, as in the RP or the PNS, it is “internal
noise”.
To get some sense of what this “internal
noise” is all about, we should examine the Libet
experiment—and, for that matter, the other ex-
periments as well—from the subject’s point of
view (Orne, 1962, 1969, 1973; see also Kihl-
strom, 2002). In the classic Libet experiment, a
tone signals the beginning of each trial; subjects
are instructed to relax for 1–3 s, then fix their
gaze on the clock, and then spontaneously flick
their fingers or wrist; finally, they are asked to
report when they decided to make the move-
ment. Now let us imagine what must go on in
the mind of a subject in a libet-type experiment,
to which Libetus interruptus has been added.
OK, there’s the start. . . . Gotta relax, gotta watch the
clock, gotta remember not to blink . . . Damn! Just
blinked . . . OK, watch the clock . . . Now I’ve got to
flick this finger sometime . . . Maybe now . . . Naah, not
yet, maybe later . . . OK, soon . . . Now! Note the time
[Flicks finger] . . . OK, now wait a while . . . Oh!
Here’s the click! Gotta move . . . [Flick] . . . OK, let’s
wait a while . . . Not yet . . . Soon . . . There’s another
click! [Flick] . . . That’s been a coupla flicks, I think
I’ll take a break . . . Aaarrrghhh! Another damn click!
[Flick] . . . Gotta keep my ears open for that click and
stay ready . . . No click for a while, maybe it’s time for
me to do it on my own . . . Maybe. now . . . Naah, not
yet, maybe later . . . OK, soon . . . Now! Note the time.
[Flicks finger] . . . When’s this experiment going to be
over?
Note that, as instructed, subjects only re-
port the time at which they consciously de-
cide to move (by all accounts, the movement
itself occurs about 200 ms later). But there is
putatively a great deal of mental activity
transpiring besides this activity, and Libet’s
exclusive focus on his subjects’ actual deci-
sion as to whether and when to move misses
the additional activity entirely. True, Libet
asked his subjects to avoid “any preplanning
or concentration on when to act.” But this is
clearly impossible— especially given the in-
struction to note the time when they finally
decide to move their fingers. The point here,
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to quote William James, is that “The first fact
for us, then, as psychologists, is that thinking
of some sort goes on (James, 1890/1980, p.
224, emphasis original). Whether the thinking
is task-dependent or task-unrelated (Raichle,
2010; Singer, 1978; Smallwood & Schooler,
2006; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der
Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011), it is still
thinking. Libet’s experiment records the sub-
ject’s conscious decision to act, but misses all
the rest of the process of consciously decid-
ing.
Papanicolaou (2017) moves beyond the Li-
bet experiment to cite more recent studies
employing neuroimaging techniques rather
than psychophysiological measures like EEG.
Some of these studies have sought to identify
the brain region(s) generating the RP (such as
the supplementary motor area), or the neural
correlates of the feeling of agency, and are
not really germane to the status of PNS. But
others simply substitute functional magnetic
resonance imaging for EEG in search of the
PNS itself, somewhat along the lines of “brain
fingerprinting” (Farah, Hutchinson, Phelps, &
Wagner, 2014). For example, Soon and col-
leagues observed a PNS arising in the fronto-
polar cortex as long as 10 s preceding the
subject’s reported decision to move (Soon,
Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). They con-
cluded that “when the subject’s decision
reached awareness it had been influenced by
unconscious brain activity for up to 10 s” (p.
545).
Unfortunately, this study shares the two
problems noted in the original Libet experi-
ment (Libet et al., 1982, 1983) and its repli-
cations and extensions: (a) Subjects had to
watch a timer—and in addition, had to decide
which of two keys to press, and (b) their
thoughts prior to the actual decision went
unrecorded—10 s is a long time for subjects
to go without thinking whether they are going
to respond, which response to make, when to
make it, and whether they are going to be
interrupted by the auditory cue. There is no
reason to think that any of this preparatory
mental activity was unconscious.
The “consciousness revolution” in psychol-
ogy and cognitive science legitimized a num-
ber of topics that had previously been consid-
ered beyond the pale of scientific discourse.
Among these were the nature of unconscious
mental life (Kihlstrom, 1987, 2012) and free
will and the experience of agency (Baer,
Kaufman, & Baumeister, 2008; Haggard &
Eitam, 2015; Searle, 2001). The Libet exper-
iment promised to bring these topics together,
purportedly showing that the conscious expe-
rience of agency is an illusion, and that the
true causes of behavior are inaccessible to
phenomenal awareness and voluntary control.
But it now appears that Libet’s experimental
results were wholly an artifact of his method.
Maybe we do not have free will, and con-
scious agency is an illusion, but the Libet
experiment offers no warrant for thinking so,
and it is time to lay it to rest.
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If you are interested in reviewing manuscripts, please write APA Journals at
Reviewers@apa.org. Please note the following important points:
• To be selected as a reviewer, you must have published articles in peer-reviewed
journals. The experience of publishing provides a reviewer with the basis for preparing
a thorough, objective review.
• To be selected, it is critical to be a regular reader of the five to six empirical journals
that are most central to the area or journal for which you would like to review. Current
knowledge of recently published research provides a reviewer with the knowledge base
to evaluate a new submission within the context of existing research.
• To select the appropriate reviewers for each manuscript, the editor needs detailed
information. Please include with your letter your vita. In the letter, please identify
which APA journal(s) you are interested in, and describe your area of expertise. Be as
specific as possible. For example, “social psychology” is not sufficient—you would
need to specify “social cognition” or “attitude change” as well.
• Reviewing a manuscript takes time (1–4 hours per manuscript reviewed). If you are
selected to review a manuscript, be prepared to invest the necessary time to evaluate
the manuscript thoroughly.
APA now has an online video course that provides guidance in reviewing manuscripts. To
learn more about the course and to access the video, visit http://www.apa.org/pubs/
authors/review-manuscript-ce-video.aspx.
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